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Abstract
This paper is a contribution to the analysis concerning fiscal insurance and public debt management. We built fiscal indicators and
present empirical evidence for the effect of the public debt management on the fiscal insurance based on the Brazilian economy. The
analysis is based on two steps: the first builds fiscal indicators and analyzes their performance over time, and the second presents
regressions of the main variables regarding public debt management on the fiscal insurance indicators. The findings denote that
there was a reduction in the fiscal vulnerability, but the public debt management was not effective in increasing fiscal insurance.
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reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: E43; E62; H62; H63
Keywords: Fiscal insurance; Public debt management; Fiscal indicators; Brazil
Resumo
Este artigo é uma contribuic¸ão à análise sobre a seguranc¸a fiscal e o gerenciamento da dívida pública. Com base na economia
brasileira foram construídos indicadores fiscais e apresentadas evidências empíricas referentes ao efeito do gerenciamento da dívida
pública sobre a seguranc¸a fiscal. A análise é realizada em duas etapas: a primeira constrói indicadores fiscais e analisa o desempenho
ao longo do tempo; e a segunda apresenta regressões das principais variáveis relativas ao gerenciamento da dívida pública sobre os
indicadores de seguranc¸a fiscal. Os resultados denotam que houve uma reduc¸ão da vulnerabilidade fiscal, mas o gerenciamento da
dívida pública não foi efetivo para aumentar a seguranc¸a fiscal.
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.  Introduction
A recurring theme in the theory of fiscal policy is the fiscal imbalance due to an increase in the government debt.
he increased level of indebtedness can imply negative impacts on the economy such as raising the cost of government
unding, reduction of private investment and thus a decrease in the potential economic growth (Lojsch et al., 2011).
oreover, excessive debt can lead to a situation of fiscal vulnerability which, in turn, threatens liquidity conditions
nd public debt solvency (Hemming et al., 2003).
The fiscal vulnerability can be mitigated by a policy based on a tight fiscal policy (increase in taxes or decrease in
overnment spending) as a way of generating primary surpluses. Another possibility for reducing fiscal vulnerability,
uch as pointed out by Giavazzi and Missale (2004), is the low cost government funding. Therefore, public debt
anagement can be an important tool for reducing fiscal vulnerability (Angeletos, 2002). In particular, the dependence
f term structure of interest rates to the state of the economy and the sensitivity of the market value of the government
ebt to the interest rate enables the public debt management to promote protection against shocks to the economy.
When the fiscal trajectories are modified by shocks on the economy, a fall in the prices of government securities
elps keep the intertemporal budget constraint. In other words, the market value of government debt equals the net
resent value of future primary surpluses thus maintaining fiscal solvency. One difficulty for this analysis as pointed out
y Faraglia et al. (2008) is that the standard indicators for evaluating the performance of the public debt management
o not allow one to observe a possible reduction in the fiscal vulnerability. According to these authors the use of fiscal
nsurance indicators open the doors for studies concerning public debt stabilization against fiscal shocks.
This paper is a contribution for the analysis concerning fiscal insurance and public debt management through
mpirical evidence for one of the largest emerging economies. This analysis is especially important because traditionally
he conduct of fiscal policy in emerging economies is considered permissive and thus the risk of a fiscal imbalance
s high. Moreover, it is important to highlight that in a different way from Faraglia et al. (2008) who cannot use a
ime series approach due to a resulting problem of a lack of reliable inference, the analysis for Brazil is not subject to
his problem. Since 1999, the Brazilian National Treasury announced a strategy for extending the maturity of federal
ecurities and for improving the composition of government liabilities. As a result, key variables such as maturity and
omposition of debt change over time.
In short, this paper builds indicators and makes an empirical analysis that permits us for the first time to evaluate
he fiscal performance of the Brazilian economy concerning the effect of the public debt management on the fiscal
nsurance. With this objective, the analysis is divided into two main parts. The first builds four fiscal indicators (coupon
ayments, ratio of market value of debt to GDP, relative persistence of debt, and covariance between the primary
eficit and the rates of return on debt) and analyzes their behavior over time. The second makes regressions (Ordinary
east Squares – OLS – and Generalized Method of Moments – GMM) for observing the effect of the main variables
egarding public debt management (on the average maturity of debt and public debt indexing factors) on the fiscal
nsurance indicators. The findings indicate that debt management was not effective in increasing fiscal insurance.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 depicts the data and the fiscal indicators. Section 3 presents the
mpirical evidence through OLS and GMM models regarding the effect of the management debt on fiscal insurance.
ection 4 concludes the article.
.  Data  and  methodology
As pointed out by Faraglia et al. (2008), most fiscal indicators in the literature fail in the analysis on the role of
ebt management in providing insurance against budget shocks as to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Under this view,
 first indicator that is considered is the coupon payments (cp) and it is the result of the internal federal government
ominal interest payments (interest) divided by federal domestic securities (debt), then
cp  =  interest/debt.  (1)Public debt stability is very important. As highlighted by Nosbusch (2008) it is desirable that an increase (decrease)
n the interest rate due to a shock in the economy is offset by a decrease (increase) in the market value of government
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debt in order to protect the budget from shocks. Therefore, a second indicator is given by the ratio of market value of
debt (MV) to GDP (Y),
MV  ∗ =  MVt/Yt. (2)
In a general way, the market value of government debt is not available and it is common practice to use the par value
of debt. However, as pointed out by Butkiewicz (1983), par value is a poor proxy for market value, especially when
interest rates are changing rapidly. Hence, the market value is a result of MVt = [(1 + Mat·c)/(1 + Mat·r)]·P, where: Mat
is the term to maturity, c is the coupon rate, r  is the yield, P is the par value.
The third indicator takes into account the fiscal insurance and it is related with the persistence of debt. Based on the
market value of government debt and the primary deficit (w), a measure of debt management is a result of
Ψ1k =  PkMV −  Pkw Ψ2k =
PkMV −  Pkw
Pkw
(3)
where PkMV =  Var(MVt −  MVt−k)/kVar(MVt −  MVt−1) and Pkw =  Var(wt −  wt−k)/kVar(wt −  wt−1). The only
difference between the indicators is that Ψ2k is normalized by the degree of persistence in the primary
deficit.
The greater Ψ  the worse the performance of debt management and negative values are indicative of complete
market outcomes. The persistence of public debt can be reduced by adjusting the primary deficit, a fact that hampers
the measurement of the performance of debt management. The reduction of persistence must come from a change in
the returns of securities, an effect that can be captured by the relative persistence of the market value of debt to primary
deficit. The persistence of the indicator takes on, for example, outstanding reduction effects due to increases in the
primary surplus.
Taking into account the concept of fiscal insurance that the debt management can offset the impact of the primary
deficit on the market value of debt, thus minimizing debt fluctuations involves exploiting a negative covariance between
the primary deficit to GDP (w*) and the rates of return on debt (R*MV*). Hence,
ρw∗,R∗MV ∗ = Cov(w
∗
t , R
∗
t MV
∗
t )
σw∗σR∗MV ∗
,  (4)where MV*  is the market value of government debt to GDP, and σ  denotes the standard deviation.
With the aim of building the above-mentioned indicators for the Brazilian economy in a time series perspective, the
variables listed below are used. All data is monthly, accumulated in the last 12 months, deflated by Extended National
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Consumer Price Index (IPCA – official price index), beginning in January 2007 and ending in September 2012 (69
observations). The reason for this period is that the Anbima Market Index which is crucial for building the fiscal
indicators does not consider the treasury bonds indexed to the exchange rate and the share of the federal government
debt indexed to the exchange rate became negligible from 2006. Hence,
- Domestic federal debt (par value) – P  – (excluding debt securitization and Agrarian Debt Securities) – averages of
the last 12 months – available from the Brazilian National Treasury;
- Primary result – federal government – w  – (available in Time Series Management System of Central Bank of Brazil
– CBB);
- Gross Domestic Product – Y – (available in Time Series Management System of CBB);
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 Coupon interest rate – cp  – is a result of the ratio between the nominal interest – internal federal government
(available in Time Series Management System of CBB) and the domestic federal debt (par value) – P  (available from
the Brazilian National Treasury);
 Yield – r  – is the growth rate (12 months) of the general Anbima Market Index (IMA) (available in Time Series
Management System of CBB). The IMA is a public bond portfolio benchmark. It is an index which comprises four
sub-indexes, related to bond indexers – fixed rate, linked to IPCA, linked to General Price Index and floating (Selic
rate). The IMA represents the evolution of prefixed treasury bonds market portfolio.
 Medium term securities issued – federal securities debt – Mat  – average maturity of the last 12 months (available in
Time Series Management System of CBB).
According to Giavazzi and Missale (2004) an increase in the sustainability of the public finance is a result of the
ombination of a reduction in coupon interest rate and the stabilization/reduction of the public debt. As can be seen
n Fig. 1, the coupon interest rate fell in the beginning of the period, but after the subprime crisis it increased and
egan to oscillate at a higher level. Regarding the market value of debt, the trajectory shows that although there was
onsiderable fluctuation in the period there was not an unsustainable path.
The graphs on the persistence of the federal government debt denote that from a perspective of short-term (3, 6, and
 months), there was in a greater part of the period, a performance near zero (see Fig. 2). This observation suggests
hat a shock on the market value of debt was quickly absorbed. It is important to note that during the period after the
ubprime crisis (August 2008–September 2009) the relative persistence of debt was negative which, in turn, indicates
 strong sustainability of the government budget in the period. Another period that deserves attention is from the last
uarter of 2010 to the last quarter of 2011 due to the fact that the market value of debt has been more persistent than the
rimary result. The increase in the market value of debt can be a result of change in the expectations of government’s
scal discipline implying a higher risk premium. There was a loosening of fiscal and monetary policies in the years of
009 and 2010 due to an unfavorable external environment. Furthermore, both inflation rate and interest rate (Selic)
ncreased in the period and thus also caused a deterioration in the public debt management.
As can be seen through Fig. 3 there existed a negative covariance between the primary deficit and the rates of return
n debt. This negative covariance is observed in almost all period under review. This result is in consonance with that
bserved by Angeletos (2002), Barro (2003), and Nosbusch (2008). In other words, management of the returns of the
ecurities can protect the budget from changes in public sector’s borrowing requirements.
It is important to highlight that the main objective of the Brazilian National Treasury is focused on two points: (i)
radually replacing floating rate bonds with fixed rate or inflation-linked instruments as a way of reducing market risk;
nd (ii) increasing the average maturity of outstanding debt as a manner of reducing the refinancing risk. As can be
een from Fig. 4 the average maturity, as well as the long term maturity debt (longer than 1 year – MatLT), is increasing
ver time.2 Regarding the public debt profile, it is observed that the strategy of increasing the participation of securities
ndexed to the price index (IPCA – I IPCA) and decreasing securities indexed to the Selic rate (I  Selic) is working. On
he other hand the share of fixed-rate securities (Fix) remained relatively stable in the period.
With the objective of observing whether the strategy adopted by the Brazilian National Treasury of extending the
verage maturity of public debt and improving the public debt profile helped the fiscal insurance, an empirical analysis
s made. The baseline model is a result of the relationship of the form:
Xit =  α0 +  α1Matt +  α2Zit +  εt,  εt∼N(0,  σ2) (5)
here Xit =  ψi,k,  ρW∗,R∗MV ∗ is a vector of the performance indicators for the debt management; and Zit is a vector of
he main public debt indexing factors:
 I  Selic  – share of the federal public debt indexed to the Selic rate (available from CBB – time series management
system). It is the main indexing factor of the Brazilian public debt. I  IPCA  – share of the federal public debt linked to the IPCA (available from CBB). This indexing factor deserves
attention under an inflation targeting system because the control over inflation reduces the risk of public debt
monetization.
2 Data regarding long term maturity is available from the Brazilian National Treasury.
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Table 1
Determinants of fiscal insurance and persistence (Maturity).
Regressor Md OLS GMM
C Mat Fix I Selic I IPCA R2 DW C Mat Fix I Selic I IPCA J-Stat NI R2
ψ1,3 1 −0.014 0.298 −3.916 −4.503 −4.849 0.05 1.59 −0.057 1.009 −4.955 −5.095 −5.533 4.103 7 0.01
(0.782) (0.680) (0.154) (0.115) (0.094) (0.535) (0.774) (0.843) (0.836) (0.839) (0.251)
2 −0.002 0.293 0.434 0.01 1.60 −0.022 0.361 0.655 3.819 5 0.00
(0.969) (0.675) (0.485) (0.666) (0.796) (0.227) (0.282)
3 −0.003 0.174 −0.184 0.00 1.59 −0.018 0.262 −0.253 3.888 7 0.00
(0.949) (0.801) (0.763) (0.698) (0.815) (0.820) (0.566)
4 −0.006 0.390 −0.583 0.01 1.64 −0.036 0.351 −0.190 4.650 8 0.00
(0.905) (0.590) (0.416) (0.474) (0.740) (0.750) (0.590)
ψ2,3 1 0.949 2.214 2.740 8.381 6.656 0.09 0.83 0.983 3.814 3.799 9.536 9.514 2.960 8 0.07
(0.000) (0.411) (0.787) (0.427) (0.532) (0.001) (0.718) (0.851) (0.625) (0.620) (0.565)
2 0.937 1.618 −4.589 0.07 0.76 0.766 0.120 −6.008 4.124 6 0.05
(0.000) (0.527) (0.046) (0.001) (0.986) (0.041) (0.389)
3 0.939 3.166 4.013 0.06 0.75 0.862 7.828 4.286 1.197 9 0.01
(0.000) (0.216) (0.076) (0.000) (0.073) (0.011) (0.977)
4 0.964 2.369 0.679 0.02 0.57 0.867 0.616 0.685 7.213 7 0.01
(0.000) (0.386) (0.801) (0.001) (0.903) (0.819) (0.205)
ψ1,6 1 −0.005 0.824 −2.449 −2.260 −2.536 0.02 1.50 −0.068 1.138 −4.034 −4.024 −4.101 3.333 8 0.00
(0.948) (0.428) (0.531) (0.578) (0.537) (0.389) (0.615) (0.610) (0.637) (0.665) (0.504)
2 0.002 0.795 −0.233 0.01 1.51 −0.052 0.920 −0.589 3.231 5 0.00
(0.980) (0.419) (0.789) (0.512) (0.527) (0.545) (0.357)
3 0.002 0.879 0.237 0.01 1.52 −0.041 1.060 0.752 6.577 8 0.00
(0.981) (0.367) (0.782) (0.524) (0.407) (0.125) (0.362)
4 0.003 0.905 −0.186 0.01 1.51 −0.030 0.711 −0.115 6.697 8 0.01
(0.972) (0.375) (0.854) (0.575) (0.232) (0.843) (0.350)
ψ2,6 1 31.510 −1.656 14.394 24.039 31.510 0.11 1.00 1.454 −7.443 43.792 60.837 70.966 1.960 8 0.03
(0.000) (0.769) (0.498) (0.277) (0.161) (0.001) (0.432) (0.343) (0.145) (0.073) (0.743)
2 1.628 −0.188 −10.650 0.07 0.95 1.260 −5.898 −18.849 1.206 7 0.01
(0.000) (0.972) (0.030) (0.008) (0.549) (0.064) (0.944)
3 1.672 2.428 2.521 0.01 0.84 1.460 1.877 4.885 4.978 8 0.00
(0.000) (0.663) (0.607) (0.000) (0.878) (0.266) (0.547)
4 1.720 −1.680 11.546 0.06 0.81 1.308 −2.810 6.105 4.861 7 0.03
(0.000) (0.767) (0.043) (0.012) (0.693) (0.327) (0.433)
ψ1,9 1 0.222 0.411 −1.814 1.244 1.124 0.04 0.42 0.341 0.826 −3.803 0.624 1.828 5.042 8 0.01
(0.171) (0.856) (0.832) (0.889) (0.901) (0.156) (0.867) (0.783) (0.965) (0.899) (0.283)
2 0.219 0.358 −2.945 0.04 0.42 0.387 1.904 −3.106 5.055 8 0.01
(0.164) (0.867) (0.126) (0.070) (0.732) (0.510) (0.537)
3 0.225 1.247 1.855 0.02 0.36 0.392 0.799 1.455 3.107 8 0.00
(0.158) (0.561) (0.327) (0.109) (0.884) (0.666) (0.795)
4 0.239 0.593 1.194 0.01 0.34 0.323 1.561 0.726 4.769 8 0.00
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Table 1 (Continued)
Regressor Md OLS GMM
C Mat Fix I Selic I IPCA R2 DW C Mat Fix I Selic I IPCA J-Stat NI R2
(0.136) (0.793) (0.593) (0.028) (0.597) (0.847) (0.574)
ψ2,9 1 3.649 11.238 39.069 53.638 49.389 0.04 0.27 2.415 6.004 39.805 64.146 58.517 1.829 8 0.00
(0.000) (0.420) (0.456) (0.326) (0.371) (0.128) (0.816) (0.830) (0.736) (0.781) (0.767)
2 3.543 9.161 −10.037 0.02 0.24 3.703 14.099 −7.109 0.378 8 0.02
(0.001) (0.489) (0.394) (0.004) (0.426) (0.803) (0.984)
3 3.540 12.741 10.131 0.02 0.23 2.652 14.881 4.845 2.222 6 0.01
(0.001) (0.331) (0.380) (0.098) (0.494) (0.437) (0.695)
4 3.604 10.687 1.845 0.01 0.20 2.994 5.493 0.215 4.187 7 0.00
(0.000) (0.439) (0.892) (0.035) (0.882) (0.988) (0.523)
ρW∗,R∗VM∗ 1 −0.320 1.085 1.780 3.297 2.735 0.09 0.29 −0.341 0.752 4.445 6.510 7.272 2.308 8 0.01
(0.000) (0.180) (0.556) (0.296) (0.391) (0.001) (0.774) (0.640) (0.477) (0.466) (0.679)
2 −0.325 0.880 −1.141 0.07 0.26 −0.319 1.286 −2.506 6.276 8 0.00
(0.000) (0.252) (0.097) (0.000) (0.608) (0.059) (0.393)
3 −0.325 1.282 1.115 0.07 0.28 −0.314 1.238 0.980 2.316 8 0.07
(0.000) (0.094) (0.098) (0.001) (0.014) (0.022) (0.804)
4 −0.318 1.095 0.081 0.03 0.21 −0.323 0.059 0.541 7.034 8 0.01
(0.000) (0.179) (0.920) (0.000) (0.973) (0.458) (0.318)
Note: Md is the model. C is the constant term. P-values between parentheses. NI is the number of instruments in GMM models in a way to assure at least 60 observations in the regressions. The
variables in the regressions are differentiated based on unit root tests (see Table A.1), when it is needed.
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Table 2
Determinants of fiscal insurance and persistence (long-term maturity).
Regressor Md OLS GMM
C MatLT Fix I Selic I IPCA R2 DW C MatLT Fix I Selic I IPCA J-Stat NI R2
ψ1,3 1 −0.008 −0.031 −3.988 −4.511 −4.797 0.05 1.59 −0.040 −0.040 −4.227 −4.707 −4.800 4.818 8 0.04
(0.901) (0.865) (0.147) (0.122) (0.102) (0.720) (0.916) (0.716) (0.683) (0.713) (0.306)
2 0.012 −0.074 0.298 0.01 1.61 −0.009 −0.095 0.396 4.401 7 0.00
(0.841) (0.678) (0.644) (0.876) (0.528) (0.396) (0.354)
3 0.015 −0.092 −0.080 0.01 1.62 −0.008 −0.105 −0.210 3.750 7 0.00
(0.812) (0.612) (0.903) (0.904) (0.514) (0.792) (0.586)
4 0.016 −0.105 −0.475 0.01 1.65 0.042 −0.248 −0.406 3.468 6 0.00
(0.797) (0.533) (0.484) (0.528) (0.099) (0.425) (0.483)
ψ2,3 1 0.758 0.952 0.239 4.326 4.098 0.10 0.70 0.522 0.964 4.949 13.467 9.969 2.173 8 0.03
(0.002) (0.162) (0.981) (0.684) (0.701) (0.206) (0.689) (0.859) (0.632) (0.715) (0.704)
2 0.737 1.016 −3.659 0.10 0.67 0.516 0.578 −1.894 4.028 7 0.04
(0.001) (0.115) (0.118) (0.028) (0.398) (0.292) (0.402)
3 0.724 1.120 2.157 0.08 0.60 0.418 2.109 −0.005 4.514 8 0.04
(0.002) (0.093) (0.364) (0.105) (0.083) (0.998) (0.608)
4 0.692 1.358 1.631 0.07 0.54 0.570 1.320 0.716 4.225 5 0.07
(0.003) (0.030) (0.512) (0.045) (0.040) (0.761) (0.646)
ψ1,6 1 0.014 −0.093 −2.638 −2.260 −2.373 0.01 1.50 −0.022 −0.113 −2.324 −2.105 −2.388 5.087 8 0.00
(0.878) (0.725) (0.502) (0.587) (0.570) (0.855) (0.800) (0.797) (0.851) (0.844) (0.278)
2 0.024 −0.116 −0.503 0.01 1.52 0.060 −0.228 −0.545 2.151 8 0.00
(0.781) (0.644) (0.580) (0.520) (0.162) (0.540) (0.828)
3 0.022 −0.099 0.272 0.00 1.52 0.007 −0.128 0.328 6.066 8 0.00
(0.801) (0.697) (0.767) (0.948) (0.751) (0.714) (0.416)
4 0.018 −0.070 0.092 0.00 1.50 0.031 −0.092 0.164 2.121 5 0.00
(0.836) (0.768) (0.924) (0.736) (0.684) (0.810) (0.548)
ψ2,6 1 1.670 0.247 14.675 23.839 31.036 0.11 1.00 0.858 2.479 0.030 8.542 14.109 1.414 8 0.06
(0.001) (0.863) (0.490) (0.291) (0.172) (0.521) (0.624) (0.999) (0.942) (0.915) (0.842)
2 1.587 0.205 −10.377 0.07 0.95 1.107 −0.442 −5.260 3.018 8 0.01
(0.002) (0.882) (0.042) (0.032) (0.744) (0.094) (0.697)
3 1.470 1.045 0.847 0.01 0.80 1.008 3.308 4.667 4.715 7 0.05
(0.004) (0.473) (0.871) (0.061) (0.076) (0.333) (0.452)
4 1.467 1.233 11.192 0.07 0.83 1.144 0.871 4.924 3.102 6 0.04
(0.003) (0.346) (0.037) (0.041) (0.537) (0.255) (0.541)
ψ1,9 1 −0.051 1.364 −4.246 −3.512 −2.309 0.12 0.40 −0.069 1.337 −19.810 −16.547 −13.628 1.861 8 0.02
(0.786) (0.016) (0.604) (0.685) (0.791) (0.893) (0.475) (0.471) (0.595) (0.653) (0.602)
2 −0.029 1.265 −1.511 0.12 0.39 −0.078 1.249 −1.746 1.255 8 0.12
(0.872) (0.018) (0.427) (0.760) (0.100) (0.237) (0.940)
3 −0.051 1.420 −0.191 0.11 0.36 −0.128 1.736 −0.376 2.715 8 0.10
(0.780) (0.010) (0.921) (0.610) (0.020) (0.728) (0.844)
4 −0.047 1.414 1.590 0.12 0.39 −0.003 1.022 1.838 8.331 8 0.11
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Table 2 (Continued)
Regressor Md OLS GMM
C MatLT Fix I Selic I IPCA R2 DW C MatLT Fix I Selic I IPCA J-Stat NI R2
(0.795) (0.005) (0.427) (0.992) (0.095) (0.118) (0.304)
ψ2,9 1 3.477 0.869 32.946 46.418 46.274 0.03 0.25 2.599 2.461 14.277 24.509 34.275 1.501 7 0.01
(0.006) (0.807) (0.531) (0.406) (0.409) (0.214) (0.812) (0.960) (0.915) (0.907) (0.682)
2 3.255 1.448 −9.860 0.02 0.22 2.246 1.351 −10.415 2.862 6 0.00
(0.007) (0.667) (0.421) (0.275) (0.817) (0.328) (0.581)
3 3.231 1.656 6.488 0.01 0.20 2.901 0.769 8.057 3.169 7 0.01
(0.008) (0.631) (0.600) (0.107) (0.821) (0.254) (0.674)
4 3.136 2.381 5.591 0.01 0.19 3.372 0.843 3.229 0.741 5 0.01
(0.009) (0.457) (0.666) (0.082) (0.795) (0.924) (0.864)
ρW∗,R∗VM∗ 1 −0.376 0.281 0.862 1.935 1.943 0.09 0.21 −0.417 0.557 1.653 1.378 2.502 1.528 8 0.04
(0.000) (0.171) (0.775) (0.546) (0.546) (0.000) (0.342) (0.803) (0.830) (0.706) (0.822)
2 −0.385 0.305 −0.928 0.09 0.20 −0.382 0.336 −1.001 2.573 7 0.09
(0.000) (0.118) (0.188) (0.000) (0.217) (0.049) (0.632)
3 −0.389 0.333 0.524 0.07 0.19 −0.423 0.334 0.252 2.297 6 0.06
(0.000) (0.096) (0.463) (0.000) (0.243) (0.602) (0.681)
4 −0.396 0.392 0.486 0.07 0.18 −0.450 0.524 0.785 4.230 8 0.06
(0.000) (0.036) (0.515) (0.000) (0.025) (0.106) (0.646)
Note: Md is the model. C is the constant term. P-values between parentheses. NI is the number of instruments in GMM models in a way to assure at least 60 observations in the regressions. The
variables in the regressions are differentiated based on unit root tests (see Table A.1), when it is needed.
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- Fix  – share of the federal public debt with fixed rate bonds (available from CBB). A greater share of these bonds
indicates a greater investor’s confidence in the current political economy and thus an improvement in the management
of the public debt.
Based on the equation above Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Generalized of Method of Moments are used for
regressions. The reason for the use of these methods is that they permit observing the significance of each coefficient
on each variable considered in the empirical model. Therefore, the identification of the relevant variables is crucial
for recommendation for debt management. Contrary to the manner suggested by Faraglia et al. (2008) the use of time
series for the analysis in the Brazilian case is not a drawback. Key variables such as maturity of debt change over time.
In a general way OLS models are not efficient from macroeconomic time series.3 The traditional problems of serial
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, or non-linearity imply the necessity of the use of other methods such as GMM (see
Hall, 2005).
3.  Empirical  evidence
Table 1 shows the results of regressing our performance indicators on the average maturity of debt and public debt
indexing factors (I  Selic, I  IPCA, and Fix). Contrary to standard argument that issuing longer maturity debt helps
to improve fiscal insurance, most of the results in both OLS and GMM regressions (see Table 1) present positive
coefficients on maturity although without statistical significance. The results regarding the share of the federal public
debt with fixed rate bonds are mixed in terms of the sign and only in a few cases the coefficients are significant. The
sign of the coefficients on share of the federal public debt linked to both IPCA  and Selic  are positive in most of the
models. Therefore, this result denotes that it does not matter if the government issues indexed to the inflation or the
interest rate to improve fiscal insurance. In short, the results present very little relationship between fiscal insurance
and public debt management (public debt profile and average maturity of public debt).
With the intention of checking if longer maturity debt can improve the fiscal insurance, the variable average maturity
of public debt was substituted by average maturity longer than 12 months (see Table 2). As pointed out by Nosbusch
(2008) a greater proportion of long-term government securities can provide a hedge against shocks to the economy due
to the fact that these securities are more sensitive to changes in the interest rates. The results indicate that there was
no difference regarding the statistical significance on the coefficients. However, the sign of the coefficients became
mixed, which in turn suggests that an increase in longer maturity can affect the fiscal insurance. The results regarding
the other variables in the models did not change considerably from those observed in the previous model.
4.  Conclusion
The fiscal indicators applied to the Brazilian case indicate that there was a reduction in the fiscal vulnerability for the
period from January 2007 to September 2012. Besides the stabilization of costs to service debt, the indicators of fiscal
insurance show the protection of the government budget against shocks on primary deficit was increased. Nevertheless,
the empirical evidence suggests that the public debt management had little effect in increasing fiscal insurance. A
possible reason for this result is that the low volatility of the term structure of interest rates can become the strategy
of lengthening the public debt maturity ineffective for fiscal insurance. Another explanation, such as pointed out by
Faraglia et al. (2008), is the idea that policymakers are more concerned with minimizing costs instead of the risk.
Appendix  A.
See Table A.1
3 Unit root tests Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (DF-GLS) were performed for detecting the integration order of
the series in the models (see Table A.1).
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Table A.1
Unit root tests (ADF and DF-GLS).
Series ADF DF-GLS
Lag Test C.V. 5% C.V. 10% Lag Test C.V. 5% C.V. 10%
MV 5 −3.63 −3.48 −3.17 5 −3.61 −3.13 −2.83
MV* 5 −3.83 −3.48 −3.17 5 −3.79 −3.13 −2.83
P 5 −3.56 −3.48 −3.17 1 −3.08 −3.13 −2.83
P* 5 −1.87 −3.48 −3.17 4 −1.74 −3.13 −2.83
d(P*) 3 −3.54 −3.48 −3.17 4 −2.94 −3.13 −2.83
Y 3 −2.67 −3.48 −3.17 3 −2.82 −3.13 −2.83
d(Y) 0 −3.82 −3.48 −3.17 0 −3.89 −3.13 −2.83
W 1 −1.82 −3.48 −3.17 1 −1.87 −3.13 −2.83
d(W) 0 −6.66 −3.48 −3.17 0 −6.74 −3.13 −2.83
W* 1 −1.86 −3.48 −3.17 1 −1.90 −3.13 −2.83
d(W*) 0 −6.58 −3.48 −3.17 0 −6.66 −3.13 −2.83
ρW*,MV* 1 −3.48 −3.48 −3.17 1 −3.59 −3.13 −2.83
Ψ1,3 1 −2.83 −3.48 −3.17 1 −2.85 −3.13 −2.83
d(Ψ1,3) 1 −6.20 −3.48 −3.17 0 −6.77 −3.13 −2.83
Ψ2,3 0 −3.12 −3.48 −3.17 0 −3.17 −3.13 −2.83
d(Ψ2,3) 1 −7.49 −3.48 −3.17 0 −9.95 −3.13 −2.83
Ψ1,6 1 −3.06 −3.48 −3.17 1 −3.11 −3.13 −2.83
d(Ψ1,6) 4 −5.41 −3.48 −3.17 4 −5.14 −3.13 −2.83
Ψ2,6 0 −4.11 −3.48 −3.17 0 −4.17 −3.13 −2.83
Ψ1,9 2 −3.37 −3.48 −3.17 1 −3.01 −3.13 −2.83
Ψ2,9 2 −3.15 −3.48 −3.17 2 −3.21 −3.13 −2.83
I IPCA 2 −1.43 −3.48 −3.17 2 −1.56 −3.13 −2.83
d(I IPCA) 1 −2.05 −3.48 −3.17 1 −1.23 −3.13 −2.83
d(d(I IPCA)) 0 −6.75 −3.48 −3.17 3 −3.93 −3.13 −2.83
I Selic 1 −1.29 −3.48 −3.17 1 −3.33 −3.13 −2.83
d(I Selic)) 0 −2.13 −3.48 −3.17 – – – –
d(d(I Selic)) 0 −7.14 −3.48 −3.17 – – – –
I Fix 2 −2.96 −3.48 −3.17 2 −3.34 −3.13 −2.83
d(I Fix) 1 −1.94 −3.48 −3.17 1 −1.31 −3.13 −2.83
d(d(I Fix) 0 −5.73 −3.48 −3.17 0 −4.93 −3.13 −2.83
MATLT 2 −1.39 −3.48 −3.17 1 −1.35 −3.13 −2.83
d(MATLT) 1 −3.56 −3.48 −3.17 1 −3.51 −3.13 −2.83
MAT 1 −2.39 −3.48 −3.17 2 −2.11 −3.13 −2.83
d(MAT) 0 −1.76 −3.48 −3.17 0 −1.92 −3.13 −2.83
d(d(MAT)) 0 −9.56 −3.48 −3.17 0 −9.44 −3.13 −2.83
IPCA 1 −4.45 −3.48 −3.17 1 −4.48 −3.13 −2.83
Selic 3 −2.61 −3.48 −3.17 3 −1.52 −3.13 −2.83
d(Selic) 2 −4.13 −3.48 −3.17 2 −3.85 −3.13 −2.83
cp 3 −2.75 −3.48 −3.17 3 −2.33 −3.13 −2.83
d(cp) 1 −2.90 −3.48 −3.17 1 −2.80 −3.13 −2.83
d
N
R
A
B
B
F
G
H
H
L
N(d(cp)) 1 −9.22 −3.48 −3.17 0 −11.26 −3.13 −2.83
ote: Intercept and trend are included. The final choice of lag was made based on Akaike criterion.
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